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Fifty years after Mirandav. Arizona, many have lamented the ways in which
the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have cut back on Miranda's
protections. One underappreciatedaspect ofMiranda'sdemise is the way it has
affected the development of the pretrial Sixth Amendment right to counsel
guaranteedby Massiah v. United States. Much of the case law dilutingsuspects'
Fifth Amendment Miranda rights has bled over into the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel cases without considerationofwhether the animatingpurposes ofthe
Massiah pretrial right to counsel would support such an importation. This
development is unfortunate given that the Fifth Amendment Miranda right and
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel have different foci and serve different
purposes.
Miranda has always been focused on dispelling the inherent compulsion in
the custodial interrogationenvironment in order to ensure that suspects are not
being compelled to give testimony against themselves in violation of the SelfIncriminationClause. In contrast, the Sixth Amendment pretrialright to counsel
is grounded in concepts offundamentalfairnessand equality and is designedto
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I would like to thank Tracey
Maclin and all of the participants at the Boston University School of Law Symposium
celebrating Miranda v. Arizona's fiftieth anniversary for their helpful comments on this
project. I would also like to acknowledge the generous support of the William W. Cook
Endowment at the University of Michigan.
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ensure that criminal defendants have attorneys to help them navigate the
procedural and substantive complexities of the law andface the prosecutorial
forces of organizedsociety.
It is not too late to disentangle these two constitutionalrights. In this Article,
I discuss how to achieve such disentanglement at both the federal and state
levels. I also highlight a couple of areas-fruits doctrine and warning and
waiver principles-where such disentanglement could result in significant
doctrinal distinctions that would create more robust Sixth Amendment
protectionfor criminaldefendants goingforward.
INTRODUCTION

Fifty years after Miranda v. Arizona,' many have lamented the ways in which
the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have cut back on Miranda's
protections. 2 Miranda warnings are only required when a suspect is in custody
and is being interrogated, 3 but the Supreme Court has interpreted custody so
narrowly that the police can easily avoid triggering application of the Miranda
doctrine by simply telling a suspect that he is free to go 4 or suggesting that he
"volunteer" to come to the police station for questioning. 5 And police
questioning is not always interrogation. There are routine booking questions, 6
questions that do not ask for incriminating information, 7 and questions
addressed to public safety concerns, 8 none of which trigger the required Miranda
warnings.

1 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2 See, e.g., Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CALIF. L. REv. 1519, 1521

(2008) ("In the more than four decades since Mirandawas decided, the Supreme Court has
effectively encouraged police practices that have gutted Miranda's safeguards... . Miranda
is largely dead."); Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Interrogationand the Roberts Court, 63 FLA. L.
REV. 1189, 1192 (2011) (noting that there have been "a number of academic-style funerals
for Miranda").
3 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.
4

Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 514-15 (2012) (finding that a prison inmate "was not

taken into custody for Miranda purposes" when he was escorted to an interview room,
because he was told that he may leave whenever he wanted, and he was not physically
restrained); Richard A. Leo, False Confessions and the Constitution:Problems, Possibilities,
and Solutions, in JOHN T. PERRY & L. SONG RICHARDSON, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
FUTURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 169, 169-77 (2013) (emphasizing that police do not

have to give the Mirandawarnings if they "simply tell[] the suspect that he is not under arrest
and is free leave").
s California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1121-23 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S.
492, 495 (1977).
6 Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601-02 (1990).
' Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 190-91 (2004).
8 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984).
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Even when the police must give warnings, they need not read the actual
Miranda warnings. Any words that are close enough to reasonably convey the
concepts in the Miranda warnings will suffice.9 Once those words are uttered,
waiver will be presumed from the mere fact that the suspect then gives a
statement, assuming that the police do not beat the suspect or do something
particularly egregious to coerce him into talking. 10
A person who wants to assert her Miranda right to an attorney must do so
clearly and unequivocally; saying that she thinks she wants a lawyer is not good
enough and will allow the police to keep questioning her.11 If she wants to
invoke her right to remain silent, she cannot do that by remaining silent. 12 She
has to actually speak and clearly state that she wants to be quiet or the police can
keep questioning her. 13 Even a person who is able to overcome the fear and
intimidation of the environment and clearly assert her rights is not entitled to
end the questioning; she only gets a brief respite before the police will return to
start the inquisition again. 14
To make matters worse, there are myriad incentives for the police to violate a
suspect's rights under Miranda. They can use any statements that they get from
the suspect to impeach her if she dares to testify at trial,15 and if they are lucky
enough to discover physical fruits as a result of her statements, those will be
admissible to prove the State's case at trial. 16 For these reasons, officers are often
trained to question "outside Miranda."1 7 In other words, they are told to ignore
the Mirandarights and just question suspects until they get a confession or learn
about the location of physical fruits of the crime.18
Many scholars have mourned this dilution of suspects' Miranda rights. 19
Even Yale Kamisar, the father of Miranda himself and one of its most fervent

9 Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 60 (2010); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203
(1989); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1981).
1o Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010).
1 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).

12 Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 381-82.
I3 Id.
14

See Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 110 (2010) (holding that, when a person invokes

her Miranda right to counsel to end an interrogation, the police need only wait fourteen days
after the suspect is released from custody before they are permitted to reinitiate interrogation).
1s Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26

(1971).
16 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 635-42 (2004) (declining to suppress physical
evidence that is the "fruit of an unwarned statement").
17 See, e.g., Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CoRNELLL. REV. 109, 132 (1998)
(describing the widespread practice of deliberately disregarding Miranda).
"s See id.
'9 See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline, and

Fall (?) ofMiranda, 87 WASH. L. REV. 965, 966 n.2 (2012) (collecting sources describing the
death of Miranda).
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supporters, has lamented that the Miranda doctrine has taken "a bullet in the
shoulder" 20 and suffered a "heavy blow" 21 as a result of recent Supreme Court
decisions.
One underappreciated aspect of Miranda's demise is the way it has affected
the development of the pretrial Sixth Amendment right to counsel. There are
three different constitutional provisions that regulate pretrial police interrogation
practices-the Due Process Clause's voluntariness test, 22 the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, 23 and the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination. 24 The Supreme Court's blockbuster Mirandadecision brought the
Self-Incrimination Clause to center stage and relegated the due process and Sixth
Amendment right to counsel tests to supporting roles. To accomplish this Fifth
Amendment revolution, the Miranda Court integrated its Sixth Amendment
precedent into the decision and included an admonition of the right to counsel
in its famous Mirandawamings. 25 As a result of this entanglement, much of the
case law diluting suspects' Fifth Amendment Miranda rights has bled over into
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases. 26 This development is unfortunate
given that the Fifth Amendment Miranda right and the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel have different foci and serve different purposes. 27
It is not too late to disentangle these two constitutional rights. For fifty years,
the Miranda decision has been the front-runner test for determining the
constitutional admissibility of confessions. But now that Miranda has been
gutted, defendants should turn to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the
voluntariness test for protection. 28 I have discussed elsewhere how the

20 Yale Kamisar, Postscript: Another Look at Patane and Seibert, the 2004 Miranda
"PoisonedFruit" Cases, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 97, 114 (2004).
21 Kamisar, supra note 19, at 1008.

See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (providing that no one "shall be .. . deprived of
life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law"); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167
(1986) ("We hold that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a
confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
22

Amendment.").
23 U.S. CoNST. amend. VI.
24 Id. amend. V.
25

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) ("Prior to any questioning, the person

must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either

retained or appointed.").
26 See infra Part II.
27 See infra Part I.
28 See James J. Tomkovicz, Saving Massiah from Elstad: The Admissibility of Successive
Confessions Following a Deprivation of Counsel, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 711, 711

(2007) ("[S]evere erosion of the protections afforded by the Miranda doctrine has made
preservation of the Sixth Amendment safeguards against official efforts to secure admissions
of guilt all the more critical.").
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voluntariness test could develop in the wake of Miranda's demise. 29 Here, I
consider how the Sixth Amendment right to counsel might step in to address at
least some of the void. 30
Part I of this Article will discuss the different foci and purposes of the Fifth
Amendment Miranda right and the Sixth Amendment pretrial right to counsel.
Miranda has always been focused on dispelling the inherent compulsion in the
custodial interrogation environment in order to ensure that suspects are not being
"compelled" to give testimony against themselves in violation of the SelfIncrimination Clause. 31 In contrast, the Sixth Amendment pretrial right to
counsel is grounded in concepts of fundamental fairness and equality. 32 To
"minimize the imbalance in the adversary system," 33 an indigent defendant must
have his lawyer at all critical stages once the machinery of state is started against
34
him so as not to render the trial itself "a mere formality."
Part II of this Article will then discuss how the two rights have become
partially entangled, both at the United States Supreme Court level and in lower
courts. Although the courts have sometimes recognized that the two rights are
distinct and grounded their decisions on the different purposes of the two
constitutional provisions, too often courts have imported Mirandacase law into
the Sixth Amendment pretrial right to counsel context without thinking about
whether such importation makes sense given the different rationales for the two
rules. 35 As a result, some Sixth Amendment right to counsel doctrines appear
unmoored from the underlying rationales supporting the right.
Part III of this Article argues that we should disentangle these two rights,
discusses how to achieve such disentanglement, and highlights a couple of areas
where such disentanglement could result in significant doctrinal distinctions that
would create more robust Sixth Amendment protection for criminal

29 See Eve Brensike Primus, The Future of Confession Law: Toward Rules for the
Voluntariness Test, 114 MICH. L. REv. 1, 56 (2015) (arguing that disentangling the two strands
of involuntariness "will help the courts create a workable doctrine going forward").
30 Given the temporal requirement that a suspect must first be formally charged with an
offense or have a first formal hearing in order to trigger application of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, I recognize that the Sixth Amendment applies to a smaller universe of cases
than does the privilege against self-incrimination under Miranda. However, the Supreme
Court's decision to permit the Sixth Amendment to attach at the first formal hearing, see
Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008), greatly expands the number of criminal
defendants who have Sixth Amendment protection. Thus, a stronger set of Sixth Amendment
protections would have a meaningful impact for a large number of defendants.
31 See infra Section I.B.
32 See infra Section I.A.

3 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973).
34 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 224 (1967)).
35 See infra Part II.
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defendants. 36 Specifically, with respect to fruits doctrine and warning and
waiver principles, disentangling the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights would
result in greater Sixth Amendment protection for a subset of criminal
defendants.37
I.

DIFFERENT PURPOSES

The pretrial Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the Fifth Amendment
Mirandaright to be free from compelled self-incrimination have different foci
and serve different purposes.38 In the subsections that follow, I will discuss the
purposes of these two constitutional doctrines and explain how their different
approaches shaped the early contours of the rights in different ways.
A.

The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

The Sixth Amendment right to counsel "embodies a realistic recognition of
the obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the professional legal
skill to protect himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his
life or liberty, wherein the prosecution is [re]presented by experienced and
learned counsel." 39 This quotation reveals two important animating principles
that the Supreme Court has long recognized are at the core of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel: (1) fundamental fairness and (2) equality in an
adversarial system. 40
The Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright41 noted that it was "an obvious
truth ... that in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him." 42 That Court went on to quote from Powell v.
Alabama:43
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and
educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If
charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself

36 See Eda Katharine Tinto, Wavering on Waiver: Montejo v. Louisiana and
the Sixth
AmendmentRight to Counsel, 48 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1335, 1370 (2011) (arguing in the context
of warnings and waiver doctrine that lower courts should attend to "the traditional principles
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and reaffirm the analytical distinction between the
rights to counsel of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments").
37 See infra Part III.
38 See Tinto, supra note 36, at 1337 ("Historically, the Fifth Amendment right to counsel
and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel have distinct underlying goals and purposes.").
3 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).

40

Id

41

372 U.S. 335 (1963).

42

Id. at 344.

43

287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of
evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a
proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence
irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a
perfect one.44
This concept of fairness has its roots in the due process concepts of notice and
a realistic opportunity to be heard.4 5 Powell was decided pre-incorporation; it
grounded the right to effective assistance of counsel in the Due Process Clause. 46
The Powell Court suggested that criminal defendants have no real opportunity
to be heard if they do not have counsel, because they do not have the requisite
understanding of the law to know what to say to defend themselves and how to
say it consistent with the rules of evidence and procedural intricacies of the
system.47
When the Supreme Court incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and applied it to the states in Gideon, it emphasized this same concept of
fundamental fairness. 48 Since Gideon, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated
that the right to counsel is necessary "to assure fairness in the adversary criminal
process,"

49

where that fairness means a right to be heard through competent

counsel who can navigate the procedural system and present legal defenses.
Relatedly, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is motivated by "a desire to
minimize the imbalance in the adversary system that otherwise resulted with the
creation of a professional prosecuting official." 50 This "equalizing effect of the
Sixth Amendment's counsel guarantee"5 1 is also necessary to ensure that trials
are fair. After all, the accused is not just confronted with the "intricacies of the

I Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69).
45 See George C. Thomas III, Separated at Birth but Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and
the Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2001) (recognizing the
relationship between Mirandaand due process concepts).
46 See Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69 (holding that courts' refusal "to hear a party by counsel"
violates due process).
47 See id. ("The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.").
48 See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344-45 (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69).
49 United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981) (citing Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344);
see also United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307 (1973) ("[An unaided layman ha[s] little
skill in arguing the law or in coping with an intricate procedural system," so counsel is needed
"as a guide through complex legal technicalities."); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 5455 (1961) ("Only the presence of counsel could have enabled this accused to know all the

defenses available to him and to plead intelligently.").
SO Ash, 413 U.S. at 309.
51 Id.
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law" 52 at trial; he also faces "the advocacy of the public prosecutor,"53 a person
who is "experienced and learned" 54 in the law. Our adversarial system, to be fair,
must provide the defendant with an experienced and learned champion of his
own. 55
Once the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right to counsel at trial,
it quickly extended that fundamental right pretrial relying on these same
principles of fairness and equality in the adversarial system. In Massiah v.
UnitedStates, 56 federal officials used an undercover agent to elicit incriminating
statements from Winston Massiah after he had already been indicted for a
criminal offense. 57 The Supreme Court held that the undercover interrogation
violated Massiah's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, because "[a]ny secret
interrogation of the defendant, from and after the finding of the indictment,
without the protection afforded by the presence of counsel, contravenes the basic
dictates of fairness in the conduct of criminal causes and the fundamental rights
of persons charged with crime."58
Both fairness and equality concerns are implicated at a pretrial interrogation.
The defendant is confronted by an agent of the government and therefore needs
his lawyer to equalize the imbalance, and he is questioned about the elements of
criminal offenses and therefore needs his lawyer to understand the legal
elements of the crime, any defenses he might have, and how to navigate the
interrogation process. Whether the government agent is overtly questioning a
suspect or is acting in an undercover matter is irrelevant; the same fairness and
equality concerns require the guiding hand of counsel. 59 The government agent

52

Id.

s3 Id.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
1 See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177-78 (1991) ("The purpose of the Sixth
Amendment counsel guarantee-and hence the purpose of invoking it-is to 'protec[t] the
unaided layman at critical confrontations' with his 'expert adversary,' the government. . . ."
(citing United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984))). Others have recognized the
fairness and equality principles that underscore the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See,
e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right to Exclusion: ConstitutionalPremises and
DoctrinalImplications, 67 N.C. L. REv. 751, 753 (1989) (describing the right to counsel as
"designed to promote balanced contests by equalizing the adversaries" in order to ensure "fair
play"); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A
Reconsiderationofthe CurrentRules ofAccess andRestraint, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1137,1173
(1987) (describing the "preventative assistance" approach to the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, which assumes that the defendant is unevenly matched against the power of the state
and needs an attorney to ensure "a fair fight"); Witmer-Rich, supra note 2, at 1219-21
54

(describing a number of different scholars who all describe the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel as "equalizing the process (making it fair) by inserting counsel for the defendant").
56 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
1 See id. at 201-02.
58 Id. at 205 (quoting People v. Waterman, 175 N.E.2d 445, 448 (N.Y. 1961)).
59 See id at 206 (finding a Sixth Amendment violation even when the questioning
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is still working for the prosecution, thus implicating the equality interest, and the
agent is still questioning him about the elements of a criminal offense, for which
he needs the legal advice and expertise of his counsel.
Providing the defendant with counsel for the later trial would not equalize the
earlier imbalance at the interrogation, nor would it right the unfairness that
resulted from that earlier process. When the defendant is denied an attorney at
the pretrial interrogation, his legal rights might be forever compromised, because
any resulting confession "might well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial
itself to a mere formality." 60 The right to counsel at trial would be "a very hollow
thing" 61 if the prosecutor could confront the accused before trial and get all the
evidence that she needed to convict without the defendant ever seeing his
lawyer.
As the Supreme Court later recognized in United States v. Ash, 62 "[t]his
extension of the right to counsel to events before trial has resulted from changing
patterns of criminal procedure and investigation that have tended to generate
pretrial events that might appropriately be considered to be parts of the trial
itself." 63 The Court went on to explain: "At these newly emerging and
significant events, the accused was confronted, just as at trial, by the procedural
system, or by his expert adversary, or both." 64 Pretrial events at which the
accused requires "aid in coping with legal problems or assistance in meeting his
adversary" 65 are "critical stages," and the defendant's right to the assistance of
counsel extends to these critical stages. 66
Notably, these same principles of fairness and equality were used to limit the
scope of the Sixth Amendment pretrial protection. In Ash, the Supreme Court
considered whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extended to pretrial
photographic identification procedures-whether showing a photo array to a
witness and asking her to identify the criminal was a "critical stage." 67 The
Supreme Court had already deemed corporeal identification procedures-where
the defendant is himself placed in a line up or show up-critical stages. 68 But
the Ash Court held that photographic identifications were different. With a
photographic identification, "no possibility arises that the accused might be
misled by his lack of familiarity with the law or overpowered by his professional

government agent was undercover).
60 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
61 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487 (1964) (quoting In re Groban, 352
U.S. 330,
344 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting)).
62 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
63 Id. at 310.
64

Id.

Id. at 313.
66 Id. at 310-11 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967)).
65

67
68

Id. at 300-01.
See Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-39.
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adversary." 69 Providing counsel would not "remove any inequality in the
adversary process itself." 70 The defendant's attorney could examine the photos
later to determine if there were any legal problems and present those at trial.
Thus, because the defendant is not physically present at the photo array, there is
no need for him to confront the intricacies of the system and no possibility that
he will need his champion to face the adversary. If the fairness and equality
principles do not suggest a need for counsel, the stage is not critical and the Sixth
Amendment is not implicated.
Fairness and equality principles also played an important role in the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is initially
triggered. In 1972, the Court noted that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel begins, or is triggered, "at or after the time that adversary judicial
proceedings have been initiated against him . .. whether by way of formal
charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment." 71 As the
Court put it:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is. . . the starting point of
our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the
government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the
adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified. It is then
that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of
organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and
72
procedural criminal law.

Stated differently, once the charges are filed or the criminal process begins in
a formal way, the prosecutor and the machinery of the government get involved.
At that point, the defendant needs his champion to face the intricacies of the law,
ensure that he is able to raise defenses, and equalize the imbalance that would
result if the prosecution team were to proceed unchallenged by a legal rival. The
Sixth Amendment right to counsel starts when the prosecution begins, because
that is when the attorney is needed to ensure fairness and equality in the criminal
process. 73

69

Ash, 413 U.S. at 317.

70 Id. at 319.

71 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972) (plurality opinion); see also Estelle v.
Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 469-70 (1981); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 226-27 (1977).
72 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-90; see also Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 233-34
(2008) (quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-90); Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 304 (1988)
(quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-90).
7 When the Supreme Court later added the "first formal hearing" to the list of pretrial
events that could trigger a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, it again emphasized

these principles of fairness and equality: "[A]n accusation filed with a judicial officer is
sufficiently formal, and the government's commitment to prosecute it sufficiently concrete"
that the defendant is "faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed
in the intricacies of substantive and procedural criminal law." Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 207

(quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689).
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Some will object to my suggestion that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
pretrial is predominantly about ensuring fairness and equality in the criminal
process. They may argue that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel's focus on
fairness is primarily about ensuring that the results of trials are fair, meaning
that innocents are not unjustly convicted. 74 After all, they will claim, when the
Supreme Court created a legal test for assessing trial counsel's effectiveness in
Stricklandv. Washington,75 it held that deficient performance by a trial attorney
was not sufficient to merit a new trial. Reversal is only required if a lawyer's
deficient performance at trial actually prejudiced the defendant and "so
undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot
be relied on as having produced a just result." 76 But this myopic focus on
Strickland ignores the Supreme Court's decisions in Gideon77 and UnitedStates
v. Cronic78 and the difference between pretrial and post-trial assessment of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the total deprivation of counsel
at trial is structural error, which requires automatic reversal without any inquiry
into possible prejudice, because "any person haled into court, who is too poor to
hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him." 79
Even in the post-trial context, complete deprivation of counsel obviates the need
for any prejudice inquiry,80 leaving the court to focus on the fundamental
fairness and equality concerns discussed above.
In Cronic, decided the same day as Strickland, the Supreme Court recognized
that a prejudice inquiry would be inappropriate "if the accused is denied counsel
at a critical stage," because the resulting trial would be inherently unfair.8 1 The
Cronic Court cited Hamilton v. Alabama82-a case in which the State had
unconstitutionally denied the defendant counsel for his pretrial arraignment-as
an example of a situation where a prejudice inquiry would be inappropriate.83
This aspect of Cronic was consistent with the Supreme Court's treatment of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in other pretrial cases. The Court's inquiry

74 See, e.g., Uviller, supra note 55, at 1169 (describing one view that the right to counsel
exists to prevent "the erroneous conviction of an innocent person"); Witmer-Rich, supranote
2, at 1219 (describing this approach as a "just outcome" approach to the Sixth Amendment).
7 466 U.S. 668, 700 (1984).
76 Id. at 686.
n Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
78 466 U.S. 648, 666 (1984).
* Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
80 See id. at 344-45.
81 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659.
82 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
83 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n.25 (citing Hamilton, 368 U.S. at 55) ("The Court has
uniformly found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was
either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the
proceeding.").
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in pretrial cases has always focused on fairness and equality concerns and not
on prejudice to the ultimate outcome. 84 In fact, the Court's holding in Kansas v.
Ventris8 5 made it quite clear that pretrial Sixth Amendment inquiries should not
focus on the reliability of the ultimate outcome. 86 The issue in Ventris was
whether the State should be permitted to impeach a defendant who testifies at
trial with a statement that was obtained in violation of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment Massiah right to counsel at a pretrial interrogation. 87 In order to
reach its decision, the Court confronted the question of when an individual's
pretrial Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated. The Court held that "the
Massiah right is a right to be free of uncounseled interrogation, and is infringed
at the time of the interrogation." 8 8 In so holding, the Court stated that "[i]t is
illogical to say that the right is not violated until trial counsel's task of opposing
conviction has been undermined by the statement's admission into evidence,"
because "[a] defendant is not denied counsel merely because the prosecution has
been permitted to introduce evidence of guilt . . .. The assistance of counsel has
been denied, however, at the prior critical stage which produced the inculpatory
evidence." 89 The Court decided that the Sixth Amendment violation "occurs
when the uncounseled interrogation is conducted." 90 That is when the violation
is complete, and the question of its later admissibility is about "the scope of the
remedy for a violation that has already occurred." 9
Thus, the pretrial Sixth Amendment right, as defined in Ventris, is not
concerned with the ultimate effect on the outcome or the prejudice or lack
thereof to the defendant. It only asks whether counsel was denied at a pretrial
critical stage where the fairness and equality concerns discussed above would
require counsel's presence.
The Fifth Amendment MirandaRight

B.

In Miranda, the Supreme Court applied the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination to the police stationhouse and held that when the
police take an individual into custody and interrogate her, the environment is
inherently compulsive such that the Fifth Amendment privilege requires the

84 See supra notes 56-73 and accompanying text.
85 556 U.S. 586 (2009).
86 Id at 594; see also James J. Tomkovicz, Sacrificing Massiah: Confusion over Exclusion
and Erosion of the Right to Counsel, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1, 39 (2012) (noting that

"[t]he details of Strickland's 'actual ineffectiveness' doctrine and its underlying premises are
wholly incompatible with Ventris's conception of Massiah"); Witmer-Rich, supra note 2, at
1222 (noting that "the Ventris opinion rejected the 'just outcome' model").
8 Ventris, 556 U.S. at 588.
88

Id. at 592.

89 Id.
90

Id

9' Id. at 593.
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police to take some steps to dispel that inherent compulsion. 92 The famous
Mirandawarnings were the Court's suggested means of advising the suspect of
her rights and dispelling the compulsion in the atmosphere. 93 Without warnings
or some other equally effective means of dispelling the compulsion, any
resulting statements would be deemed compelled in violation of the Fifth
Amendment. 94
The primary purpose of the Mirandaruling was to prevent criminal suspects
from being compelled to give testimony that would be used against them at
trial. 95 This focus on compelled trial testimony stands in stark contrast to the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel's focus on fairness and equality throughout
the trial process. 96 Although both doctrines make some reference to fairness, the
concepts are quite different. As the Miranda Court itself recognized, the SelfIncrimination Clause serves particular purposes:
To maintain a 'fair state-individual balance,' to require the government 'to
shoulder the entire load,' to respect the inviolability of the human
personality . .. [by] demand[ing] that the government seeking to punish an
individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labors,
rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own
mouth.97
There is a sense in which it is unfair to force a person to incriminate himself, but
it is a different kind of unfairness. The fairness that the Court spoke of in
Miranda is not about preventing the criminal defendant from having an
opportunity to adequately defend himself. It is about individual dignity and
autonomy and preventing the government from compelling a suspect to admit
his own guilt.
These different foci affect both the timing of the two rights as well as their
scope. First, with respect to timing, the two rights have different triggering
points tied to their respective animating principles. As discussed above, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is triggered at the first formal hearing or when
formal charges are filed in some way, because that is when the machinery of the
state begins and the government has committed itself to prosecute. 98 At that

92

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).

93 Id
94

Id at 457-58.

95 Id at 442 (explaining that its decision was grounded in the Fifth Amendment privilege

against compelled self-incrimination).
96 See Bidish J. Sarma, Robert J. Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Interrogationsand the Guiding
Hand of Counsel: Montejo, Ventris, and the Sixth Amendment's Continued Vitality, 103 Nw.

U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 456, 461 (2009) (describing the Fifth Amendment Miranda right "as
the right to 'counsel as protector,"' against compulsion and the Sixth Amendment right to

counsel "as the right to 'counsel as strategist"' who weighs the pros and cons of defendant's
moves and manages the flow of information between the defendant and the state).
97 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460 (citations omitted).
98 See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 198 (2008).
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point, the defendant needs her attorney to address the legal complexities of the
system and to face off against her adversary. 99 In contrast, Miranda is focused
on compulsion and so has a different triggering point. Anytime a person is placed
in custody and is about to be interrogated, there is inherent compulsion and the
Mirandaprotections kick in regardless of whether some official criminal process
has started. 00 The combination of custody and interrogation is what gives rise
to a presumption of compulsion so that is the triggering moment for Miranda.
These different triggering points correspond to an important difference in the
scope of protection under the two doctrines. Because the triggering date of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is tied to the moment when the government
commits itself to prosecute, the scope of the right is limited to those charges that
the government has formally pursued. Stated differently, the Sixth Amendment
is offense specific.101 If the government has charged a defendant with a criminal
offense, the machinery of the state has begun on that charge and the defendant
is entitled to his lawyer on that charge, but there is no Sixth Amendment right
to counsel on other uncharged offenses, because the machinery of the state has
not started on those uncharged offenses yet. Thus, the fairness and equality
principles have not yet been implicated with respect to other offenses. In
contrast, the mere fact of custodial interrogation is what triggers the Miranda
concern with compulsion, so it does not matter what the charges are-the
compulsive environment exists with respect to whatever subject the police are
questioning a suspect about. 102
The timing of a constitutional violation is also different under Miranda and
Massiah. Miranda is grounded in the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, which indicates that witnesses shall not be compelled to give
testimony against themselves. 103 The Supreme Court has interpreted the words
"witness" and "testimony" to mean that the privilege against self-incrimination
is a trial right focused on preventing statements from being used against the
speaker when the speaker becomes a witness at a trial.1 04 There is no Miranda
violation pretrial; the violation occurs when the person becomes a witness at a
trial and his statement is used as testimony against him. 0 5 In contrast, the Sixth

9 See id.
"o Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
101 See Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 164 (2001); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175
(1991).
102 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 ("[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination.").
103 U.S. CONsT. amend V.
104 See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 638 (2004); Chavez v. Martinez, 538
U.S. 760, 773-74 (2003).
1os See Martinez, 538 U.S. at 770. The Martinez Court would have found a constitutional
violation pretrial if the police had extracted a confession through torture, but the Justices
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Amendment Massiah violation happens pretrial when the uncounseled
interrogation is conducted, because that is when the suspect is unfairly faced
with the intricacies of the system and in need of his champion to help him
confront his adversary. 106 Thus, there can be pretrial Sixth Amendment
violations.
The scope of the two rights is also quite different as a result of their differing
underlying rationales. Consider how the doctrines address questioning by
undercover agents. In the Sixth Amendment context, it does not matter if the
government agent wears police blue or prison gray-whether the person doing
the questioning is known to be a police officer or is an undercover agent. 107 The
agent who questioned Massiah was an undercover agent. 08 The Court still found
a Sixth Amendment violation, because the questioning implicated the fairness
and equality concerns at the heart of the doctrine.1 09 But in the Miranda context,
the degree of compulsion is quite different when the agent is undercover. There
is inherent compulsion when a suspect is placed into a room and knows that he
is being confronted by the police. But there is no compulsion if the suspect does
not even know that the person to whom he is speaking is an agent of the state,
so there is no need for Miranda warnings when an undercover officer questions
a suspect."10
Miranda is a doctrine that is solely concerned with confessions whereas the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to all critical stages pretrial. Pretrial
interrogation is just one example of a critical stage. Other pretrial stages that
have been deemed critical include corporeal identification procedures,
preliminary hearings, psychiatric examinations, and certain kinds of
arraignments." Sixth Amendment doctrine is broader in this respect than
Miranda, because the principles that trigger the need for counsel pretrial are
fundamentally different and apply in other contexts as well."12

differed on whether that violation would sound in Due Process or would be a SelfIncrimination Clause problem. Compare Martinez, 538 U.S. at 773 (arguing that torture
would constitute a due process violation), with Martinez, 538 U.S. at 789-90 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that torture would violate the Fifth
Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause).
106 See Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 (2009).
107 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964).
10 Id. at 202.
109 Id. at 204-05.
"0 Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 294 (1990).
'".Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 217 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring) (collecting
case law on critical stages).
112 See Tinto, supra note 36, at 1341 ("The Sixth Amendment's focus on the fairness and

integrity of the entire adversarial process explains why the Sixth Amendment's right to
counsel protects the defendant in stages of the proceedings . . that the Fifth Amendment does
not.").
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ENTANGLEMENT

Despite the different purposes and foci of the pretrial Sixth Amendment right
to counsel and the Miranda right, the Supreme Court and many lower courts
have been conflating Mirandaand Massiah in recent years. 113 More specifically,
courts have imported limitations on the scope of the Miranda right into the
Massiah context without considering whether the underlying purposes of the
14
Sixth Amendment right to counsel would support such limits.1
Arguably, the fault for the entanglement of these two doctrines lies at the feet
of the Miranda decision itself.11 5 In the years leading up to Miranda, the
Supreme Court was struggling to find a suitable way to regulate confession
law. 116 The due process voluntariness test had proven too mushy and
unpredictable to effectuate any uniform change. 117 In the heyday of
incorporation, the Court began to look to more specific amendments to regulate
police practices. The Self-Incrimination Clause was not its first choice. Two
years before Miranda, the Supreme Court brought the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel into the stationhouse to regulate police interrogation practices.
In Escobedo v. Illinois,'18 the Court held:
[W]here, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect
has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the
suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his
lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute
constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied 'the
Assistance of Counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution as 'made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment.' 11 9

113 See Sarma, Smith & Cohen, supra note 96, at 456 (noting that the Supreme Court "has

conflated the Fifth Amendment prophylactic rule with the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel").
114 Id. at 458.
"1s Jeremy M. Miller, Law and Disorder: The High Court's Hasty Decision in Miranda
Leaves a Tangled Mess, 10 CHAP. L. REv. 713, 714-16 (2007) (noting that the Miranda
decision itself confused the two doctrines).
16 See YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 512-15 (14th ed. 2015)

(describing the shortcomings of the voluntariness test and the inevitability of the Court's
decision to move away from it).
" See id at 512 ("Moreover, as the rationales for the Court's coerced confession cases

evolved, it became increasingly doubtful that terms such a 'voluntariness.' 'coercion,' and
'breaking the will' were very helpful in resolving the issue."); Primus, supra note 29, at 1112 (describing the voluntariness test).
" 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
119 Id. at 490-91.
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In so holding, the Court looked to the fairness and equality concerns that
animated its other Sixth Amendment cases. Citing Massiah,Hamilton, and other
pretrial Sixth Amendment right to counsel cases, the Court emphasized that
Danny Escobedo, like those defendants, was at a "'stage when legal aid and
advice' were most critical." 1 20 He was "a layman" who "was undoubtedly
unaware that under Illinois law an admission of 'mere' complicity in the murder
plot was legally as damaging as an admission of firing the fatal shots." 2 1 He
needed "[t]he 'guiding hand of counsel"' to help him navigate the intricacies of
the system. 122 The fact that Escobedo had not yet been formally charged or had
any formal process was unimportant to the majority. 123 Once Escobedo had
become the "focus" of the investigation, the State's commitment to prosecute
was sufficiently strong that the Court felt the Sixth Amendment protections
should apply. 124
The Supreme Court's expansion of Sixth Amendment protection in Escobedo
to include those who have been arrested and were the "focus" of police
investigation left many lower courts and commentators confused. 125 When was
someone the "focus" of an investigation and how much of the Escobedo factspecific holding was required to trigger application of the Sixth Amendment?
Was it enough if a suspect was arrested for a crime or did he also have to request
counsel for the Sixth Amendment to apply? What warnings would the police
have to give and what effect would they have? Many thought the Court would
clear up the scope of the pretrial Sixth Amendment doctrine in Miranda,126 but
the Court took an entirely different approach.
In Miranda, the Court pivoted away from the Sixth Amendment and turned
instead to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to regulate
confession law.1 27 It reinterpreted Escobedo as a Fifth Amendment case (thus
destroying Escobedo's precedential value for Sixth Amendment purposes) and
noted that its newfound custodial interrogation test was really what it had meant
all along with the Escobedo focus test.1 28 As part of its attempt to integrate this

120
121
122

123
124

Id at 486.
Id
Id
Id. at 485.
Id at 490-91.

See Yale Kamisar, Miranda: The Case, the Man, and the Players, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1074, 1076 (1984) (reviewing LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS (1983))
(describing the confusion).
126 See, e.g., John J. Flynn, Panel Discussion on the Exclusionary Rule, 61 F.R.D. 259,
278 (1972) (noting that the attorneys in the Miranda case thought the Court would focus on
the Sixth Amendment "because that is where the court was headed after Escobedo").
127 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439
(1966).
128 Id at 442, 444 n.4 (discussing that the Court has "undertaken
a thorough reexamination of the Escobedo decision and the principles it announced" and "[t]his is what we
meant in Escobedo when we spoke of an investigation which had focused on an accused");
125
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Sixth Amendment precedent into the decision, the Miranda Court included an
129
admonition of the right to counsel in its famous Mirandawarnings. The seeds
of entanglement were planted.
Despite Miranda'sconflation of the right to counsel and the privilege against
self-incrimination, the two rights developed relatively independently for a time.
Their triggering conditions were different 130 and the Court recognized
differences in the scope of their protection tied to their different animating
rationales. 131 Even when the Court chose to have their doctrines converge, it did
so only after deciding that their different purposes supported the same doctrinal
result.
For example, in Edwards v. Arizona,132 the Court held that police may not
return later to reinitiate questioning once a suspect affirmatively invokes his
Miranda right to counsel.133 The Court's rationale for this additional layer of
protection was grounded in the Fifth Amendment focus on compulsion:
[I]f a suspect believes that he is not capable of undergoing such questioning
without advice of counsel, then it is presumed that any subsequent waiver
that has come at the authorities' behest, and not at the suspect's own
instigation, is itself the product of the "inherently compelling pressures"
13 4
and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect.
In Michigan v. Jackson,135 the Court adopted the same rule in the Sixth
Amendment context and held that police may not return to question a suspect

see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 429 (1986) ("Although Escobedo was originally
decided as a Sixth Amendment case, 'the Court in retrospect perceived that the "prime
purpose" of Escobedo was not to vindicate the constitutional right to counsel as such, but, like
Miranda, "to guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination ....""').
129 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473 ("In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent
of his rights under this system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right
to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him.").
130

Compare Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., 554 U.S. 191, 194 (2008) (holding that Sixth

Amendment is triggered at first formal hearing), with Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (noting that
custodial interrogation is what triggers protection).
131 See, e.g., Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980) (noting that the Sixth
Amendment is violated if the police deliberately elicit incriminating information from a

suspect post-indictment without warnings, but that there is a Miranda violation if the police
interrogate an individual who is in custody without warnings, and further noting that the
deliberate elicitation and interrogation standards in the two contexts are not interchangeable);

see also Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 524-25 (2004) (noting that the Sixth
Amendment standard is "deliberate-elicitation" and not "interrogation").
132

451 U.S. 477 (1981).

133 Id. at 485.
134

Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988) (extending Edwards and discussing its

rationale).
135

475 U.S. 625 (1986).
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who had been formally charged and had affirmatively invoked his Massiah right
to counsel. 136 Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in Jackson, noted that the
animating purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel independently
supported this additional level of protection for Massiah rights. 137 He
emphasized the defendant's need to be able "to rely on counsel as a 'medium'
between him and the State" once he is charged and "face[s] ... the prosecutorial
forces of organized society . .. [and] the intricacies of substantive and
procedural criminal law." 38 After discussing the relevant Sixth Amendment
precedents, the Court noted that "the difference between the legal basis for the
rule applied in Edwards and the Sixth Amendment claim asserted in these cases
actually provides additional support for the application of the rule in these
circumstances." 1 39 Even though the same rule would apply in both contexts, it
was supported in each by the underlying purposes of the constitutional
provisions at stake.
As the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts began to cut back on criminal
defendants' criminal procedure rights, the distinctions between the two rights
sometimes got lost. In Patterson v. Illinois,140 for example, the Supreme Court
held that reading the Mirandawarnings is generally sufficient to advise a suspect
of both his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.141 Harkening back to the Miranda
decision itself, the Court noted that "this Court has recognized that the waiver
inquiry focuses more on the lawyer's role during . .. questioning, rather than the
particular constitutional guarantee that gives rise to the right to counsel at that
proceeding." 42 Because the Mirandawarnings indicate that a statement can be
used against the suspect, the Court reasoned, the suspect knows "what benefit
could be obtained by having the aid of counsel while making such statements"
and therefore is "aware of the consequences of' waiving his rights (under both
Amendments). 143
This conflation of the two amendments, however, fails to consider the
different purposes that they serve. Advising a suspect of his rights, the
consequences of speaking, and giving him the option to ask for help may be
sufficient to dissipate the compulsion and prevent a Fifth Amendment violation,
but the concerns are quite different under the Sixth Amendment. Saying that a
confession will be used against him does not advise the suspect of how a lawyer
could help him; it merely tells him what the state wants to do with his statement.
The suspect may not understand the nature of the charges, that complicity can
be just as damning as actual perpetration of the offense, or that a lawyer could
136
117

Id. at 636.
Id. at 632.

* Id. at 631-32 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984)).
Id. at 632 (emphasis added).
487 U.S. 285 (1988).

139
140
141

142
143

Id. at 296.
Id at 299 n.12.
Id. at 293-94.
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explain the legal elements to him. 144 It is not always intuitive to a suspect that a
lawyer might examine the indictment for legal sufficiency before permitting him
to talk or that the lawyer might be better at negotiating a plea for him if he does
not give an incriminating statement.1 45 In the world of sentencing guidelines
with downward departures, an attorney might be able to negotiate a deal for a
client who is inclined to cooperate with authorities. 146 All of these are
"intricacies of [the] substantive and procedural criminal law" that an attorney
could help the defendant understand and that a defendant might not understand
47
are part of the attorney's job.1
The Miranda warnings also do nothing to inform suspects of the equalizing
role that attorneys are supposed to play in the adversarial system. The suspect
might not understand what it means to be indicted148-that the prosecution has
enough evidence in its possession to have formally charged him with an offense
and that the prosecution has officially assumed an adversarial position. He might
think he can talk his way out of things, wholly unaware that there is no talking
his way out at that point. An attorney could explain what an indictment is and
what it means about the government's posture toward him and give him the
champion to which he is constitutionally entitled. By failing to consider the
underlying rationales for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the Patterson
Court imported a waiver regime that is ill suited to the purposes of that right.
Whereas the Rehnquist Court failed fully to consider the different rationales
animating the Mirandaand Massiah rights, the Roberts Court actively distorted
Massiah precedent to support a conflation of Miranda and Massiah law. In
Montejo v. Louisiana,149 the Roberts Court overruled Jackson, which had held
that once a suspect invokes his Massiah right to counsel, the police may not
approach him again to try and get a waiver from him unless his counsel is
present. 50 Recall that Jackson had imported the Fifth Amendment Mirandabased doctrine from Edwards into the Sixth Amendment context, but it had done
so by noting that the different rationales supporting the two constitutional

14 Id. at 308 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145 Id. ("The Miranda warnings do not, for example, inform the accused that a lawyer
might examine the indictment for legal sufficiency before submitting his or her client to
interrogation or that a lawyer is likely to be considerably more skillful at negotiating a plea
bargain and that such negotiations may be most fruitful if initiated prior to any
interrogation.").
146 See Tinto, supra note 36, at 1350 (noting the incentives that defendants often have to
cooperate).
147

Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).

148 See United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1150 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[I]n the absence
of adequate explanation of the significance of an indictment, it would not be proper to hold
that defendant understood the import of the right he was giving up."), abrogatedby Patterson
v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988).
149 556 U.S. 778 (2009).
'so Id. at 780-81.
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provisions independently supported the same rule in both contexts.151 Justice
Scalia, writing for the Court in Montejo, refused to acknowledge the Sixth
Amendment underpinnings of the Jackson decision and recast the Jackson case
as a case about compulsion. 152
Instead of recognizing the fairness and equality principles that Jackson itself
had relied on, the Montejo Court said that "Jackson represented a 'wholesale
importation of the Edwards rule into the Sixth Amendment."' 153 More
specifically, the Montejo majority indicated that the Jackson decision, like its
Fifth Amendment counterpart, was premised on an "antibadgering rationale,"l 54
because it was "meant to prevent police from badgering defendants into
changing their minds about their rights."1 ss This "wholesale importation" of the
Fifth Amendment anticompulsion rationale into the Sixth Amendment pretrial
right to counsel context is an unfair reading of the Jackson decision that is
problematic and fails to understand the important differences between these two

rights. 156
The Montejo Court's distortion of Jackson and its overt conflation of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rationales have had important repercussions. Lower
courts are now stating that "[o]nce formal adversary proceedings begin, the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel applies in exactly the same way as the Fifth
Amendment right applies to custodial interrogation."157 Others are relying on

15
152

See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
Montejo, 556 U.S. at 787.

'" Id. (quoting Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 175 (2001)).
154 Id at 788.
'" Id. at 789.
156 See id. at 805 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The majority's analysis flagrantly
misrepresents Jackson'sunderlying rationale and the constitutional interests the decision
sought to protect."); Craig Bradley, What's Left ofMassiah?, 45 TEX. TECH L. REv. 247, 25253 (2012) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment cases generally, were never anti-badgering cases,
contrary to the Montejo majority's claim. In fact, Jackson never mentions badgering as a
concern." (footnote omitted)); Emily Bretz, Don't Answer the Door: Montejo v. Louisiana
Relaxes Police Restrictionsfor QuestioningNon-Custodial Defendants, 109 MICH. L. REv.
221, 226 (2010) (describing how Montejo "conflates constitutional doctrine and blurs the
protections of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments"); Michael C. Mims, A Trapfor the Unwary:
The Sixth Amendment Right to CounselAfter Montejo v. Louisiana, 71 LA. L. REv. 345, 369
(2010) ("The most unsettling element of the Court's ruling in Montejo is its complete
disregard for the traditional rationale behind the Sixth Amendment."); Tinto, supra note 36,
at 1337 ("The Montejo Court, however, failed to recognize the fundamental principles of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and instead collapsed a Fifth Amendment analysis into its
evaluation of a Sixth Amendment question.").
'" Pecina v. State, 361 S.W.3d 68, 76-77 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see also United States
v. Paulino, No. 10-00062, 2011 WL 2292303, at *4 (D. Guam June 7, 2011) ("[T]he court's
analysis and findings regarding an alleged Fifth Amendment violation simultaneously
addresses an alleged Sixth Amendment violation."); Paris v. Carlton, No. 1:07-cv-65, 2010
WL 1257970, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 26, 2010) ("[T]he overruling of Michigan v. Jackson
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Montejo to diminish Sixth Amendment protections in related contexts without
considering whether the underlying rationales of the Sixth Amendment right
would support such extensions. For example, Montejo was a case involving a
defendant who had been automatically appointed an attorney and the question
was whether that appointment should count as an invocation. 158 Iowa has
extended Montejo to situations in which the accused actually retains an attorney
himself. 1 9 Texas has gone further and held that even if a suspect affirmatively
invokes his right to counsel, Montejo allows the police to reinitiate interrogation
without counsel present. 160 None of these courts are considering the underlying
rationales for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when making their
decisions.
The entanglement of Miranda and Massiah goes far beyond lower court
interpretations of Montejo's scope. Following the trend set in Patterson and
Montejo, lower courts have been borrowing a number of the Supreme Court's
doctrinal limitations in the Mirandacontext and importing them wholesale into
the Sixth Amendment context without addressing the different doctrinal
62
underpinnings of the two rights. 16 1 For example, in North Carolinav. Butler
and Berghuis v. Thompkins, 163 the Supreme Court recognized the validity of
implied waivers of suspects' Miranda rights. 164 In Butler, the Court noted that a
Miranda "waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the
person interrogated" even without an explicit oral or written assertion of the
intention to waive.1 65 The Court went further in Thompkins and held that "an

appears to have effectively eliminated any distinction between the Fifth Amendment and
Sixth Amendment waiver of the right to counsel." (citation omitted)). Many courts simply
cite the Montejo Court's language that "doctrines ensuring voluntariness of the Fifth
Amendment waiver simultaneously ensure the voluntariness of the Sixth Amendment

waiver," Montejo, 556 U.S. at 795, and deny defendants' Sixth Amendment claims, see, e.g.,
Kemp v. Ryan, 638 F.3d 1245, 1256 n.5 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Stile, No. 1:11-CR00185-JAW, 2013 WL 945419, at *15 (D. Me. Jan. 16, 2013), aff'd, 845 F.3d 425 (1st Cir.
2017).
158 Montejo, 556 U.S. at 802-03 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159

State v. Camacho, No. 13-0903, 2014 WL 4628984, at *5-6 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 17,

2014) (extending Montejo and holding that Jackson does not apply even when a suspect elects

to retain counsel himself); see also United States v. Rojas, 553 F. App'x 891, 893 (11th Cir.
2014).
1I Hughen v. State, 297 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ("After Montejo, the
Sixth Amendment does not bar police-initiated interrogation of an accused who has
previously asserted his right to counsel.").
161 See generally Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, ConstitutionalBorrowing, 108 MICH. L.

REv. 459, 471-82 (2010) (discussing how prevalent borrowing is in constitutional
interpretation).
162
16
164
165

441 U.S. 369 (1979).
560 U.S. 370 (2010).
Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 384; Butler, 441 U.S. at 376.
Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
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individual who, with a full understanding of his or her [Miranda]rights, acts in
a manner inconsistent with their exercise has made a deliberate choice to
relinquish the protection those rights afford."1 66 Thus, according to Thompkins,
as long as "a Miranda warning was given and ... it was understood by the
accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied
waiver ...."167 Even though Butler and Thompkins were cases discussing waiver
of the Fifth Amendment Miranda rights, some lower courts and commentators
have imported this implied waiver doctrine into the Sixth Amendment context
without considering whether implying a waiver makes sense given the
equalizing and fairness rationales that underlie the Sixth Amendment
guarantee. 168
Similarly, in the Miranda context, the Supreme Court has held that the
physical fruits of a Miranda violation are admissible 169 and that second
statements obtained as part of a question-first-and-warn-later procedure are
sometimes admissible. 170 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has
already imported this line of cases into the Sixth Amendment Massiah context,
citing Patterson and noting that the Supreme Court "has emphasized the
similarity between pre-indictment suspects subjected to custodial interrogation
and post-indictment defendants subjected to questioning."1 71
The conflation of these two rights, though problematic, is not yet fully
complete. Even at the Supreme Court level, the Justices continue to sometimes
recognize distinctions between Miranda and Massiah. 172 But the doctrine is

Thompkins, 560 U.S. at 385.
Id. at 384.
168 See, e.g., United States v. Smalls, 134 F. App'x
609, 615 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Butler,
441 U.S. at 373) (noting that the defendant "never expressed any desire to have his counsel
166
167

present" and citing Butler for the proposition that "implied waiver of Sixth Amendment rights

[is] permissible"); United States v. Sepulveda-Sandoval, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1102-03
(D.S.D. 2010) (suggesting that Sixth Amendment waivers can be implied); see also Witmer-

Rich, supra note 2, at 1233 ("[T]here is every reason to think the Court will apply
the Thompkins rule equally in the Sixth Amendment context."). But see In re Darryl P., 63

A.3d 1142, 1179-91 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 2013) (refusing to extend the implied waiver doctrine
to the Sixth Amendment context).

See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643 (2004).
See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604 (2004); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318
(1985).
171 United States v. Fellers, 397 F.3d 1090, 1096 (8th Cir.
2005). As a result of the
16

170

conflation ofMiranda and Massiah, some scholars have begun trying to find one overarching
rationale for the Court's interrogation decisions that spans both Amendments. See, e.g.,
Witmer-Rich, supra note 2, at 1193 (arguing that the Supreme Court is adopting a theory of
"fair play" in the interrogation context under which suspects are given notice of their rights
and are then assumed to be "autonomous, empowered individuals who possess the knowledge
and wherewithal to assert and protect their rights and interests").
172

See, e.g., Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 591-94 (2009) (recognizing that a Sixth

Amendment violation can happen pretrial even though a Mirandaviolation does not); Fellers
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messy, and lower courts are rightly confused. As one Texas court recently put
it, "[o]ver the past four decades, the jurisprudence concerning the Fifth
Amendment right to counsel during police interrogation and the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel at all 'critical' stages of criminal proceedings had
73
become intertwined in complex and confusing ways."
III.

DISENTANGLEMENT

It is not too late to disentangle the Sixth Amendment right to counsel from the
Miranda rights under the Fifth Amendment. Because the Supreme Court has
been focused on Miranda as the primary test for determining the admissibility
of confessions, there have been very few Sixth Amendment pretrial right to
74
counsel cases on the Supreme Court's docket.1 As a result, there is still room
in a number of areas to create a vibrant Sixth Amendment jurisprudence that is
grounded in the fairness and equality principles that animate the right. In those
few areas where the Supreme Court's doctrine appears to preempt separate
consideration of Massiahand Miranda, some states have found ways to limit the
scope of the Supreme Court entanglement or have turned to their state
constitutions to get back to the original purposes of the right to counsel and
75
provide more robust protections for criminal defendants.'
In the subsections that follow, I will illustrate each of these possible ways to
disentangle these two rights. First, I will discuss fruits doctrine-an area where
Supreme Court doctrine has not yet entangled Mirandaand Massiah and explain
why consideration of the underlying purposes of these different rights should
result in different doctrinal developments going forward. Second, I will consider
the doctrine on warnings and waiver-an area where there has already been
Supreme Court conflation and talk about how lower courts can and should limit
the conflation and use other tools (like state constitutional law) to disentangle
these two rights going forward.

v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 523-25 (2004) (recognizing that the Sixth Amendment's
deliberate elicitation standard is different from the Fifth Amendment Mirandastandard).
'1n

Pecina v. State, 361 S.W.3d 68, 74 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). Interestingly, the Pecina

court thought that Montejo "disentangled the two right-to-counsel constitutional provisions

and clarified their separate purposes and applications." Id. Given the direct conflation of the
two rights in the Montejo opinion, see supra note 156 and accompanying text, this suggestion
demonstrates the depth of the doctrinal confusion in lower courts, see DarrylP., 63 A.3d at

1147 ("Litigants too often confront us with a constitutional kaleidoscope, and constitutional
overlap can quickly degenerate into constitutional chaos.").
174

See Tomkovicz, supra note 86, at 5 ("For the 45 years that followed [Massiah], the

Court devoted astoundingly little attention to the rationales or justifications for Massiah's
suppression mandate.").
17 See infra Section III.B.2.
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A. PreventingFutureEntanglement: FruitsDoctrine
Although the Supreme Court has held that statements obtained in violation of
the Sixth Amendment Massiah right are inadmissible in the prosecution's case
in chief at trial, 176 it remains a somewhat open question when derivative
evidence obtained as a result of a Massiah violation (second statements or
physical evidence) is admissible in the prosecution's case in chief. Some believe
that the "fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine," most famously applied to exclude
the derivative products of Fourth Amendment violations,177 should apply to
derivative evidence obtained as a result of Massiah violations. 178 But the
rejection of fruits doctrine for Miranda violations has led others to suggest that
Massiah should suffer a similar fate. 179
The Supreme Court has not yet imported its rejection of fruits doctrine for
Miranda violations into the Massiah context, but it has also not decided a case
about the admissibility of derivative fruits of Massiah violations in over thirty
years. Before explaining why lower courts (and ultimately the Supreme Court)
should reject the conflation of Miranda and Massiah with respect to the
admissibility of derivative evidence, it is first important to explain the current
contours of the Supreme Court doctrine in this area.
When Miranda and Massiah were decided, the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine governed the admissibility of derivative evidence obtained as a result
of constitutional criminal procedure violations. 180 Under "fruits" doctrine,
anything that the government discovered as a result of its illegal action was
suppressed as a fruit of that poisonous tree unless the evidence was discovered
from an independent legal source, would inevitably have been discovered from
76 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964); see also Michigan v. Harvey, 494
U.S. 344, 348 (1990) ("[T]he Court has held that once formal criminal proceedings begin, the
Sixth Amendment renders inadmissible in the prosecution's case in chief statements
'deliberately elicited' from a defendant without an express waiver of the right to counsel.").
The Supreme Court has held that statements obtained in violation of Massiah are admissible
for impeachment purposes. See Ventris, 556 U.S. at 594.
n See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963).
1 See, e.g., Jennifer Diana, Apples and Oranges and Olives? Oh My! Fellers, the Sixth
Amendment, and the Fruitof the Poisonous Tree Doctrine, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 985, 1025-26
(2005) (arguing for application of fruits doctrine to Massiah violations); Justin Bishop
Grewell, A Walk in the Constitutional Orchard:DistinguishingFruits of Fifth Amendment
Right to Counsel from Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel in Fellers v. United States, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 742 (2005) (arguing that fruits doctrine applies to Sixth
Amendment violations); Tomkovicz, supra note 86, at 57 (arguing that the Supreme Court
"might conclude that a fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine is essential to adequately
discourage deprivations of Massiah's pretrial guarantee").
1' See United States v. Fellers, 397 F.3d 1090, 1095 (8th Cir. 2005) (rejecting fruits
doctrine for Massiah violations).
"s See generally Yale Kamisar, On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced
Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L. REv. 929 (1995) (explaining how fruits
doctrine has been applied to Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment violations).
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an independent legal source, or was too attenuated in time, place, and
circumstances to be causally linked to the initial violation."'
Early Supreme Court case law suggested that fruits doctrine would apply to
exclude derivative evidence obtained as a result of a Massiah violation. In
United States v. Wade,1 82 for example, the Supreme Court held that when a
suspect is denied counsel at a post-indictment, corporeal line-up, any later
attempt by the eyewitness to identify the suspect at trial will be suppressed
unless the government can establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
in-court identification is based on observations of the suspect other than the
tainted and unconstitutional pretrial line up.1 83 Stated differently, the Supreme
Court applied a fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to exclude derivative in-court
identifications tainted by pretrial identification procedures that violated the
suspect's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Perhaps more on point, in Nix v. Williams, 184 the Supreme Court applied one
aspect of fruits doctrine-the inevitable discovery exception-to a violation of
a defendant's Massiah rights.185 In Nix v. Williams, the Court held that evidence
that the police inevitably would have discovered through independent
investigation would not be suppressed merely because it was discovered more
quickly through statements obtained in violation of the defendant's Massiah
rights.1 86 Noting that "the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine has not been
limited to cases in which there has been a Fourth Amendment violation" and that
fruits doctrine was used to address Sixth Amendment violations in the context
of pretrial identification procedures, the Court adopted the same analysis in the
187
context of Massiah violations.
After Wade and Nix v. Williams, many thought that fruits doctrine governed
the admissibility of derivative evidence obtained as a result of a Massiah
violation. But the Supreme Court has rejected the application of fruits doctrine
in the Miranda context in a trilogy of cases.' 88 The Court's retreat from fruits
doctrine in the Miranda context has led lower courts and commentators to
question whether fruits doctrine should continue to apply to Massiah
violations.18 9

181

See

182

388 U.S. 218 (1967).

1 JOSHUA DRESSLER& ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
374-81 (6th ed. 2013); KAMISARET AL., supra note 116, at 842-61.
183 Id. at 239-40.
184

467 U.S. 431 (1984).

I Id. at 442, 446-48.
186 Id. at 446-48.

18 Id. at 442, 446-48.
188 See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636-37 (2004); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S.
600, 615-16 (2004); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985).
189 See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
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Oregon v. Elstad 90 was the first decision in the Miranda trilogy. In Elstad,
the Supreme Court rejected the argument that fruits doctrine applies to Miranda
violations. Noting that "[t]he prophylactic Miranda warnings" are "not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution," but are only overly broad
protections put in place to protect a constitutional privilege, the Court did not
believe that there was any constitutionally poisonous tree when the violation was
a mere Miranda violation. 191 Thus, there was no reason to suppress voluntarily
given fruits, including the second statement that Elstad gave after the police had
impermissibly questioned him earlier without first administering Miranda
warnings. 192 If the original statement had been involuntarily given under the Due
Process Clause or actually compelled under the Fifth Amendment, the Court
would have suppressed the derivative statement unless it was too attenuated in
time, place, or circumstances. 193 But a mere Miranda violation did not merit
such treatment.
The Court qualified its Elstad approach in Missouri v. Seibert,194 a case
involving a deliberate police department practice of questioning a suspect first
without Miranda warnings and then coming back, giving Miranda warnings,
obtaining a waiver, and getting the suspect to repeat the incriminating
statements. The Court suppressed the second statement that was obtained as a
result of this deliberate question-first-and-warn-later strategy, but without a
unified approach. 195
A four-Justice plurality thought courts addressing the admissibility of the
second statement should analyze the circumstances of the two interrogations to
determine if the Miranda warnings could reasonably function effectively to
dispel the inherent compulsion for the second statement.1 96 Justice Kennedy
provided the fifth vote and would have applied Elstad in these situations
(meaning that the second statement would only be suppressed if it was
involuntarily given or if it was the fruit of a truly involuntary or actually
compelled first statement) unless the two-step interrogation strategy was a
deliberate attempt to circumvent Miranda.197 If part of a deliberate strategy, then
he would suppress the second statement unless the police took specific, curative

190 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
191

Id. at 305 (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)).

192 See id. at 318.

193 Id. at 309.
194 542 U.S. 600 (2004).
195

Id. at 604 (plurality opinion).

196 Id. at 615 (discussing factors that would be relevant to whether the Mirandawarnings

could function effectively including, "the completeness and detail of the questions and
answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the
timing and setting of the first and second statements, the continuity of police personnel, and
the degree to which the interrogator's questions treated the second round as continuous with

the first").
"I Id. at 620.
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steps to ensure that a reasonable suspect in the circumstances would understand
the import and effect of the Mirandawarnings. 198 The four-Justice dissent would
have applied Elstad and admitted the statements. 199 Thus, five Justices wanted
to apply Elstad whenever the two-part questioning was not deliberate. And five
Justices wanted to consider the circumstances to determine whether the second
set of Miranda warnings could be effective and understood by the suspect when
the police strategy was deliberately designed to circumvent Miranda.200 Only
one Justice thought fruits doctrine should govern. 20 1 Although Seibert modified
the Elstad approach, a majority of the Court continued to reject the application
of fruits doctrine to Mirandaviolations. 202
Finally, in United States v. Patane,203 the Supreme Court refused to apply
fruits doctrine to suppress physical evidence obtained as a result of a Miranda
violation. 204 Justice Thomas, writing for the plurality, noted that the failure to
read Miranda warnings is not a constitutional violation; no constitutional
violation of the self-incrimination privilege can occur until there is a trial and
testimony is admitted against a witness; and physical evidence is not
testimony. 205 Thus, "there is, with respect to mere failures to warn, nothing to
deter" and "no reason to apply the 'fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine." 206 After
Elstad, Seibert, and Patane, it is clear that fruits doctrine is no longer the
governing test for determining the admissibility of derivative fruits of Miranda
violations.
With this change in the legal landscape, one circuit has already imported the
Elstad-Seibertline of cases into the Sixth Amendment context. In United States

191 Id. at 621-22 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (describing curative measures as including "a
substantial break in time and circumstance between the prewarning statement and the
Miranda warning" or "an additional warning that explains the likely inadmissibility of the
prewarning custodial statement").
"' Id. at 622-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
200 In reality, it is a bit more complicated than even that suggests because Justice Kennedy
was the only Justice who thought it was a good idea to consider whether the police action was
deliberate or not. As a result, lower courts remained quite confused about what part of the
Seibert decision constitutes the binding holding. See Lee Ross Crain, The Legality of

DeliberateMiranda Violations: How Two-Step National Security InterrogationsUndermine
Miranda and Destabilize Fifth Amendment Protections, 112 MIcH. L. REv. 453, 455 n.14

(2013) (describing the confusion in lower courts about the holding in Seibert).
201 See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617-18 (Breyer, J., concurring).
202 in some respects, the plurality's consideration of whether the Mirandawarnings could
operate effectively to dispel the compulsion will operate like a fruits test-a fact that Justice

Breyer relied on to join the plurality decision. See id at 618. However, the foci of the tests
will be somewhat different.
203 542 U.S. 630 (2004).
204 See id. at 633-34.
205

Id. at 636-37; see also id at 645 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing that the Fifth

Amendment is not implicated).
206

Id. at 642 (majority opinion).
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v. Fellers,207 the Eighth Circuit brought the Elstad regime into the Massiah
context citing Pattersonand noting that the Supreme Court "has emphasized the
similarity between pre-indictment suspects subjected to custodial interrogation
and post-indictment defendants subjected to questioning." 208 This importation is
misguided if one considers the differences between the Miranda and Massiah
doctrines.
The Elstad-Seibert-Pataneline of cases is predicated on the Court's belief
that a failure to read Miranda warnings is not a constitutional violation in its
own right and thus there is no poisonous tree that can bear suppressible fruits. 209
In contrast, Ventris makes it clear that a pretrial Massiah violation is itself a
constitutional violation. 210 As a result, there is a constitutionally poisonous tree
that can bear fruit, which is a reason to refuse to apply the Elstad line of cases
to Sixth-Amendment violations. 2 11
The underlying purposes of the pretrial right to counsel also suggest that
derivative evidence should be excluded under a fruits analysis. The Court
extended the right to counsel to critical pretrial stages in recognition of the fact
that there are important times when defendants need expert assistance to address
the legal complexities of the system and to match a professional adversary. 212
The Court also recognized that depriving defendants of legal counsel at these
stages could reduce the resulting trial to a mere formality, because trial counsel
would be unable to challenge effectively the confessions, identifications, and
other evidence obtained from these pretrial events. 2 13 Thus, inherent in the
recognition of the need for counsel at critical pretrial stages was an
understanding that the evidence obtained at these stages should not be admitted
unless an attorney was present pretrial to ensure it was lawfully obtained or to
document unlawful practices for later challenge. To permit the admission of
derivative evidence would exacerbate the unfairness and sanction the inequality
214
that the state created by violating the pretrial right to counsel.
Courts faced with questions about the admissibility of derivative evidence
obtained as a result of Massiah violations have an opportunity to prevent
additional conflation of the Miranda and Massiah rights. Lower courts should
reject the Eighth Circuit's attempt to conflate the Miranda and Massiah

207
208

397 F.3d 1090 (8th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 1096.

209 See supra notes 191-92, 205-06 and accompanying text.
210 Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 592 (2009).

211 See Tomkovicz, supra note 86, at 57 (arguing that this point "militate[s] in favor of a
presumptive derivative-evidence bar like that which governs under the Fourth Amendment").
212 See supra Section I.A.
213

See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985).

214 See Tomkovicz, supra note 28, at 759 ("Physical or other evidence that is derived in
fact from-that has any causal connection to-failures to honor the entitlement to an

equalizing assistant cannot be admitted into evidence without inflicting constitutional
damage.").
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doctrines and should rely on the underlying purposes of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel to adopt a fruits analysis for determining the admissibility of
evidence derived from pretrial Sixth Amendment violations.
B. Responding to Entanglement: Warnings and Waiver
Unlike with fruits doctrine, the Supreme Court has already conflated Fifth and
Sixth Amendment doctrine in the context of warnings and waiver. As discussed
above, in Patterson and Montejo the Supreme Court suggested that Miranda
warnings will generally suffice to warn suspects of both of these rights and that
the doctrines surrounding waiver of the rights will be similar. Still, there is room
within these decisions to limit the scope of the federal entanglement and create
some Sixth Amendment doctrine going forward that is more consistent with the
underlying purposes of the pretrial right to counsel. Additionally, states can (and
some already do 215 ) rely on their own state constitutional provisions to
disentangle the right to counsel from the privilege against self-incrimination and
to provide their citizens with counsel protections that are more consistent with
the underlying rationale of the right to counsel.
1.

Limiting Federal Entanglement

Scholars, advocates, and courts can limit federal entanglement of these two
rights in Sixth Amendment cases by arguing for a narrow reading of Patterson
and Montejo and relying on the right to counsel's underlying rationales to argue
that those cases should not be extended to other related contexts.
a. Narrowly Reading Pattersonand Montejo
After Pattersonand Montejo, many courts have stated that Mirandawarnings
suffice to advise a suspect of his Sixth Amendment rights and that a valid
Miranda waiver will be a valid Massiah waiver.2 16 But this is an overly broad
reading of Patterson and Montejo and one that only encourages additional
entanglement of the two rights. Carefully read, Patterson and Montejo leave
many open questions about both the adequacy of Miranda warnings and about
waiver doctrine in the Massiah context.
In Pattersonitself, the Court held that "[a]s a general matter, then, an accused
who is admonished with the warnings prescribed by this Court in Miranda, has
been sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights, and of
the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his waiver on this basis will
be considered a knowing and intelligent one." 217 In Montejo, the Court reiterated

See infra Section III.B.2.
See Tinto, supra note 36, at 1358 n. 127 (collecting cases); see also McCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 154, at 314 (7th ed. 2014) ("Generally, then, a waiver of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel requires no more than an effective waiver of Miranda rights.").
215

216

217

Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296 (1988) (citation omitted).
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this line and noted that Miranda warnings "typically do[] the trick." 218 But the
PattersonCourt noted a number of situations where that "general matter" might
not be true and where the Miranda warnings alone might not suffice, including
cases involving (1) police deception about defense counsel's presence and role;
(2) police failure to inform the defendant that he has been formally charged with
a crime; and (3) police questioning of represented defendants without counsel
present.
Police deception about defense counsel's presence and role. The Patterson
Court recognized that "we have permitted a Miranda waiver to stand where a
suspect was not told that his lawyer was trying to reach him during questioning;
in the Sixth Amendment context, this waiver would not be valid. See Moran v.
Burbine."219 In Moran v. Burbine,220 the Supreme Court held that police failure
to tell a suspect that an attorney hired by his sister was trying to reach him did
not affect the validity of his Fifth Amendment Miranda waiver. Because the
Miranda warnings themselves were sufficient to dissipate the inherent
compulsion in the environment, the Court believed that Brian Burbine's waiver
was constitutionally valid.221 In so holding, however, the Moran Court noted
that, had Burbine's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached, the analysis
would have been different: "[T]he police may not interfere with the efforts of a
defendant's attorney to act as a 'medium" between [the suspect] and the State'
during the interrogation." 222 Thus, if an attorney is trying to reach her client, and
the client's Sixth Amendment rights have been triggered, the client must be so
informed. Miranda warnings that do not include information about the suspect's
attorney trying to reach him would be insufficient.
The Montejo majority cited Moran with approval, noting that Jesse Montejo
"may also seek on remand to press any claim he might have that his Sixth
Amendment waiver was not knowing and voluntary, e.g., his argument that the
waiver was invalid because it was based on a misrepresentation by police as to
whether he had been appointed a lawyer, cf. Moran, 475 U.S., at 428-29."223
Thus, contrary to the suggestion of some, Montejo does not mean that "Morantype deception ... does not affect the validity of a Sixth Amendment waiver." 224
The Supreme Court in Moran and subsequently in Patterson and Montejo has
suggested that, when police fail to inform a defendant that his attorney is trying
to reach him, actively mislead him about whether he has a lawyer, or both, it

218

Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786-87 (2009).
U.S. at 296 n.9.
475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986).
See id.
Id. at 428 (alterations in original) (quoting Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176

219 Patterson,487
220
221
222

(1985)).
223
224

Montejo, 556 U.S. at 798 (citing Burbine, 475 U.S. at 428-29).
Mims, supra note 156, at 376.
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poses a Sixth Amendment problem once the right to counsel has been
triggered. 22 5
The language in these cases is admittedly dicta, but this is a potential opening
in Patterson and Montejo where relying on the underlying rationales of the
pretrial right to counsel supports additional Sixth Amendment protections that
would not exist in the Fifth Amendment context. If the right to counsel is about
ensuring that a defendant has an attorney to equalize the playing field and to give
him expert assistance to navigate the intricacies of the substantive and
procedural law, then permitting the police to deny him access to his attomey
(either by refusing to tell him that the attorney is there or by lying to him about
the existence of the attorney) would undermine those goals. Instead of equalizing
his position vis-A-vis the government, it would permit the government to gain an
unfair advantage in contravention of the underlying purpose of the right to
counsel. Thus, it should pose a Sixth Amendment problem if the government
fails to inform the defendant that his attorney is trying to reach him or if the
government lies to him about whether counsel has been appointed for him.
In fact, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated not just when police
lie about whether counsel has been appointed, but also when they lie or deceive
a suspect about the potential scope of an attorney's representation or an
attorney's abilities to represent the suspect as a ploy to get a suspect to waive his
227
rights. 226 Consider, for example, what the police did in Michigan v. Harvey.
When Tyris Harvey indicated that he did not know if he should talk to his lawyer,
the police told him "that he did not need to speak with his attorney, because 'his
228
The police
lawyer was going to get a copy of the statement anyway."'
do for you
can
lawyer
the
that
nothing
is
there
message to Harvey was clear:
provide
will
we
and
us,
to
provide
you
that
here other than get the information
attorney's
the
belittle
to
efforts
police
Any
later.
that information to the lawyer
role undermine the fairness and equality principles at the heart of the right to
counsel doctrine and should negate the validity of any Sixth Amendment waiver.
The PattersonCourt held that the Miranda warnings will generally suffice for
Sixth Amendment purposes, because it believed that suspects would intuitively
understand "what benefit could be obtained by having the aid of counsel while
making such statements." 229 But when the police incorrectly minimize the role
that a lawyer can play, it destroys the suspect's understanding of the benefits of
the attorney's presence and makes any subsequent waiver unknowing.

225 See Bradley, supra note 156, at 256 ("Montejo and Moran suggest that if the police

mislead the defendant about the fact that he has counsel, that might render the waiver
invalid.").
226 See Tinto, supra note 36, at 1363-65 (arguing that deception should not be permitted).
227

494 U.S. 344 (1990).

Id. at 346. The State conceded the Sixth Amendment violation in Harvey, and the only
issue before the Court was whether the statements were admissible for impeachment purposes.
See id.
229 Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 294 (1988).
228
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Along these same lines, the Mirandawarning indicating that a lawyer will be
appointed for the suspect if he cannot afford one might be affirmatively
misleading for some defendants who have already retained or been appointed
counsel. Questions of waiver are fact-intensive and suspect-specific. 230 The
Miranda warning that "if you cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided
for you" 23 1 may suggest to some suspects that they do not already have an

attorney or that the attorney they have been appointed is no longer working with
them. Although many scholars have noted that this warning is confusing to those
who already have counsel, 232 I would argue that it also might be problematic
under the Sixth Amendment given the language in Moran, Patterson, and
Montejo about police deception. If the warning effectively communicates
(falsely) to the suspect that he either does not already have an attorney or that
his attorney has abandoned him, that deception undermines his understanding of
his Sixth Amendment rights in a way that should make any resulting waiver
unknowing. 233
Police failure to inform the defendant that he has been formally charged
with a crime. Some lower courts had suggested before Pattersonthat, in addition
to the Mirandawarnings, defendants need to be told that they have been indicted
or formally charged and what the charges are before the police can ask them to
waive their Sixth Amendment rights. 234 Patterson himself had been informed
that he was indicted for murder before police sought the post-indictment
waiver. 235 For that reason, the Court noted "we do not address the question
whether or not an accused must be told that he has been indicted before a
postindictment Sixth Amendment waiver will be valid." 236 At least one lower
court has recognized that Miranda warnings alone might not be sufficient to
advise a suspect of his Sixth Amendment rights if the suspect is not told that he

230 See Tinto, supra note 36, at 1359-60 (noting that the determination of whether a waiver

is "knowing and intelligent is a fact-specific question").
231 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
232 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 156, at 253.

233 This kind of confusing warning might be particularly problematic for certain vulnerable
defendants who are at a greater risk of misunderstanding the warnings because of a mental
disability, language barrier, lack of education, or youth.
234

See, e.g., United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1150 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that

"in the absence of adequate explanation of the significance of an indictment, it would not be

proper to hold that defendant understood the import of the right was giving up"); United States
v. Payton, 615 F.2d 922, 924-25 (1st Cir. 1980) (citing precedent that requires an individual
to be informed of the charges against her before waiver can be effected).
235

Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 288 (1988).

236 Id. at 295 n.8; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 216, § 154 ("The Court has left open
the possibility that a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may require that the
defendant be informed, or perhaps that the suspect know from some source, that the matter
has progressed beyond general police investigation to adversary judicial proceedings.").
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has been formally charged with specific crimes. 237 The principles of fairness and
equality at the heart of the right to counsel suggest that a defendant who is not
told that he has been formally charged with a specific crime cannot knowingly
and intelligently waive his Sixth Amendment rights.
The reason why the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the first
formal hearing or charge is because that marks a crucial turning point for the
defendant. The machinery of the state is now being focused against the
defendant, and the state now has enough evidence to proceed with charges.
"[A]ny questioning of the defendant by the government [after that point] can
238
The role of
only be 'for the purpose of buttressing . .. a prima facie case."'
the state shifts from investigatory to adversarial and the defendant has a right to
know that his Sixth Amendment rights have been implicated-that the situation
is now different and that he is being formally charged with a crime. To withhold
that information from him is a form of deception just as unfair as withholding
information that an attorney is trying to reach him. 239 A defendant who has not
been informed that his Sixth Amendment right has attached cannot knowingly
and intelligently waive that right: you can't waive a right that you don't even
know that you have.
In order for a Sixth Amendment waiver to be knowing and intelligent, a
suspect should be told not only that he has been "indicted" for a specific crime,
but also what it means to be indicted. Many suspects don't know what it means
to be "indicted" so using that word has little value in communicating the
suspect's change in circumstances. 240 Suspects should be told that they have
been formally charged with a specific crime, which means that the state has
concluded that there is enough evidence to officially accuse them of having
committed that crime and put them on trial for the offense. That language
communicates the change in circumstances in a way that suspects can
understand.
Once again, this is an example of a situation in which the underlying purposes
of the Miranda and Massiah rights lead to different outcomes. The Supreme
Court has held in the Mirandacontext that the suspect need not be aware of the
crimes about which he could be questioned, because knowledge of the
substantive offenses is irrelevant to the question of compulsion. 241 In the Sixth

237 See State v. Sanchez, 609 A.2d 400, 406 (N.J. 1992). The Sanchez court ultimately did
not issue a holding on this point, however, because it decided the case on state constitutional

grounds. See id. at 406-07.
238 Mohabir, 624 F.2d at 1148 (quoting People v. Settles, 385 N.E.2d 612, 616 (N.Y.
1978)); see also Patterson,487 U.S. at 306 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
239 See supra Section III.B. .a and accompanying text.
240 See, e.g., Mohabir, 624 F.2d at 1150 ("[I]n the absence of adequate explanation of the

significance of an indictment, it would not be proper to hold that defendant understood the
import of the right he was giving up.").
241 Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987) ("The Constitution does not require that
suspect know and understand every possible consequence of a waiver of the Fifth
criminal
a
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Amendment context, however, knowledge of the substantive offense is relevant
to the kind of assistance that counsel might be able to provide. A suspect facing
a misdemeanor jaywalking offense will understand the role that an attorney
could play for him and his need for expert assistance differently from a suspect
who is facing prosecution for a complex conspiracy. In order to knowingly and
intelligently waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the suspect must know
that the right has attached and for what offense.
Police questioning of represented defendants without counsel present. The
PattersonCourt limited its holding to unrepresented defendants, stating:
We note as a matter of some significance that petitioner had not retained,
or accepted by appointment, a lawyer to represent him at the time he was
questioned by authorities. Once an accused has a lawyer, a distinct set of
constitutional safeguards aimed at preserving the sanctity of the attorneyclient relationship takes effect. 242
After Patterson, a few lower courts relied on the different rationales
animating the right to counsel under Miranda and the right to counsel under
Massiah to limit Patterson's holding to cases involving unrepresented
defendants. 243
For example, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that "the
promise of legal assistance [under Miranda]is intended to counter compulsion,"
and "information concerning the opportunity to consult with counsel protects
against compulsion." 244 Counsel is waivable in that context, because "counsel's
role is nothing more than an assurance that if the suspect wants counsel, counsel
will be made available." 245 In contrast, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is
"[d]esigned to remedy any imbalance in this adversary system" and is "essential
to fairness." 246 The attorney is there to aid the defendant with "rational
decisionmaking" 247 and the Sixth Amendment is concerned with "'preserving'
the attorney-client relationship," 248 which is very different from the Miranda
context. As a result, the Texas court held that "[o]nly through notice to defense

Amendment privilege.").
242 Patterson, 487 U.S. at 290 n.3 (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985));
see also id. at 296 n.9 ("[B]ecause the Sixth Amendment's protection of the attorney-client
relationship-'the right to rely on counsel as a "medium" between [the accused] and the
State'-extends beyond Miranda'sprotection of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, there

will be cases where a waiver which would be valid under Mirandawill not suffice for Sixth
Amendment purposes." (quoting Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176)).
243 See, e.g., Holloway v. State, 780 S.W.2d 787, 795-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989); State v.
Dagnall, 612 N.W.2d 680, 695-97 (Wis. 2000).
244 Holloway, 780 S.W.2d at 792.
245

Id

246 Id. at 793.

247 Id. at 792.
248 Id. at 795.
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counsel may authorities initiate the interrogation of an indicted and represented
defendant." 249
Lower courts and commentators have begun retreating from this distinction
after Montejo because of the following language in the majority opinion:
In determining whether a Sixth Amendment waiver was knowing and
voluntary, there is no reason categorically to distinguish an unrepresented
defendant from a represented one. It is equally true for each that, as we held
in Patterson,the Miranda warnings adequately inform him "of his right to
have counsel present during the questioning," and make him "aware of the
consequences of a decision by him to waive his Sixth Amendment
rights." 250
But that language in Montejo is dicta. The Montejo Court originally granted
certiorari to decide when the Jackson protections apply in a jurisdiction like
Louisiana, where suspects are assigned counsel by the court rather than
affirmatively invoking counsel (as defendants in Michigan do). 25 1 The Court
then sua sponte asked the parties whether Jackson should be overruled. The
briefing and argument before the Court was about what triggers invocation of
Massiah rights under Jackson and whether Jackson should remain good law. It
was not about the adequacy of warning and waiver doctrine for represented
versus unrepresented defendants. With respect to waiver, the Montejo majority
explicitly noted that it was remanding the case for Montejo "to press any claim
he might have that his Sixth Amendment waiver was not knowing and
voluntary." 252 Noting that waiver matters "have heightened importance in light
our opinion today," the majority stated "[w]e do not venture to resolve these
issues ourselves." 253 The above-quoted language about represented versus
unrepresented defendants was inserted in response to language in the dissent. 254
It was not the focus of briefing and argument by the parties and was not essential
to the holding in the case and is therefore nonbinding dicta.

Id.; see also State v. Dagnall, 612 N.W.2d 680, 694 (Wis. 2000) ("After an attorney
represents the defendant on particular charges, the accused may not be questioned about the
crimes charged in the absence of an attorney.").
250 Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 798-99 (2009) (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487
U.S. 285, 293 (1988)); see also, e.g., Vasquez v. State, No. 14-15-00380-CR, 2016 WL
4483462, at *8 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 25, 2016) (noting that "[b]ased on our research,
Holloway may no longer be good law" (citing Montejo, 556 U.S. at 789)); State v. Delebreau,
864 N.W.2d 852, 855 (Wis. 2015) (noting that "Montejo effectively overruled Dagnall by
establishing that a waiver of Mirandarights is sufficient to waive the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel and that such a waiver is not presumed invalid simply because the defendant is
already represented by counsel").
251 Montejo, 556 U.S. at 780-83; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 2, Montejo v.
Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009) (No. 07-1529).
252 Montejo, 556 U.S. at 798.
249

253

Id.

254

Id. ("[R]eject[ing] the dissent's revisionist legal analysis.").
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Lower courts should disregard this dicta because it is "contrary to a long line
of precedent, stretching through the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts" 255
and is contrary to the underlying rationale supporting the right to counsel. In
Moulton, Patterson, and Harvey, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction
between represented and unrepresented defendants under the Sixth Amendment
and for good reason. Once a suspect is represented by counsel, the Sixth
Amendment guarantees him the right to rely on that counsel as a "medium"
between him and the state to minimize the system's imbalance and ensure that
the proceedings are fair.2 5 6 Yes, the Sixth Amendment is waivable. Nothing
prevents a suspect from approaching the police and sharing information without
government questioning. A suspect can also affirmatively waive the right to
counsel after having been advised of the right by the court with fact-specific
questioning designed to ensure that the defendant understands the consequences
of waiver. 257 But once the defendant has retained or been appointed counsel, the
principles of fairness and equality require the government to go through that
counsel in order to obtain a waiver of any of his rights, including his right to
counsel. 258
b.

Refusing to Extend PattersonandMontejo

Too many people have fallen down the slippery slope and are suggesting that
Montejo's importation of an antibadgering rationale into the Sixth Amendment
259
right to counsel context means a wholesale collapse of Mirandaand Massiah.
This overreading fails to recognize that the Montejo majority itself described
only the prophylactic protection in Jackson as primarily concerned with
antibadgering. 260 Montejo explicitly noted that Massiah was still good law.26 1

255 Bradley, supranote 156, at 255.
256
257

Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985).
See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).

258 Cf Bradley, supra note 156, at 258 (noting that England, France, and Italy have rules
that prohibit post-indictment questioning unless it is done in court or with counsel present). I
would go so far as to say that a defendant whose Sixth Amendment right has attached must

speak with defense counsel before being permitted to waive. See Sarma, Smith & Cohen,
supra note 96, at 462 (noting that automatic attachment of the right is necessary, because
"requiring the defendant to affirmatively request counsel undermines core Sixth Amendment
values" by "undercut[ting] [the suspect's] right to depend on counsel to guide him through
every decision important to his defense"). But that would require overruling Patterson.
259 See, e.g., Mims, supra note 156, at 374-83 (describing a parade of horribles under
which the antibadgering rationale of Montejo would upend all of Sixth Amendment law).
260

See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 787-88 (2009) (noting that the Edwards rule

was about preventing police badgering, that Jackson imported Edwards into the Sixth
Amendment, and that the only way to make sense of Jackson is to look at the antibadgering
rationale).
261

See id at 786 (citing Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204-05 (1964)).
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Given that Massiah involved undercover questioning 262-a situation that does
not involve compulsion or badgering-there is no reason to begin importing
antibadgering rationales into other Sixth Amendment areas. We should limit this
entanglement of Mirandaand Massiah to the now-overruled Jackson regime and
rely on the actual animating purposes of the right to counsel to define its scope
in related contexts. I will briefly examine three such related contexts below: (1)
actual invocation in noncustodial situations; (2) warnings in noncustodial
situations; and (3) implied waiver.
Actual invocation in noncustodial situations. After Montejo it is now an
open question what protections, if any, a suspect has if she actually invokes her
Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the police approach and read her the
Miranda warnings. There was no express invocation in Montejo, 263 and the
prophylactic protection in Jackson is now gone. Does this mean that police can
ignore a suspect's post-indictment request for counsel in noncustodial situations
where Edwards offers no protection? 264 To deny such a request would seem to
exacerbate the imbalance in the system by giving the government an unfair
advantage. The government would have the power to keep asking the suspect to
waive his Sixth Amendment rights while denying the defendant an opportunity
to have expert assistance. In fact, the government's continued pressure to get the
suspect to waive could undermine the earlier Miranda warning that the suspect
has a right to an attorney. After all, if a suspect is told that he has a right to
counsel, he invokes that right, and the government then ignores the invocation,
the suspect might reasonably believe that he had no right to counsel in the first
place.2 65 Any resulting waiver in that circumstance would be unknowing for
reasons similar to those discussed above regarding police deception about an
attorney's existence. For this reason, some have argued that the courts will need
to develop some Edwards-like protections for noncustodial suspects in this
situation. 266

262 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 202-03.

Instead, counsel was automatically appointed for Montejo pursuant to Louisiana
procedures. See Montejo, 556 U.S. at 781-82.
26 Some lower courts have suggested as much. See, e.g., Hughen v. State, 297 S.W.3d
330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ("After Montejo, the Sixth Amendment does not bar police263

initiated interrogation of an accused who has previously asserted his right to counsel.").
265

Cf Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 121 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting in a

Miranda context that if the police tell a suspect that he has a right to counsel and the suspect
then asks to speak with counsel but no counsel is provided before the police return again, "the

suspect is likely to feel that the police lied to him and that he really does not have any right to
a lawyer").
266 See, e.g., Bretz, supra note 156, at 251; Witmer-Rich, supra note 2, at 1236. Although
Jonathan Witmer-Rich would continue to apply an Edwards rule in the Sixth Amendment
context, he would not impose the fourteen-day time limitation from Shatzer. See WitmerRich, supra note 2, at 1236-37 (giving reasons why the Shatzer rule is both "unnecessary"
and "undesirable" in the Sixth Amendment setting).
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Warnings in noncustodialsituations. Factually, both Pattersonand Montejo
were cases involving custodial interrogations wherein the defendants were
approached post-indictment and were asked to waive their rights. Neither of
these cases discussed what waiver standards would apply outside of the
custodial-interrogation setting.2 67 Police are not required to administer Miranda
warnings when a suspect is not in custody, and they may not want to read the
full Miranda wamings for a number of reasons, including the fact that it is not
clear that noncustodial suspects even have a right to remain silent. 268 Given the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Howes v. Fields 269 that many prison inmates
are not in custody, 270 there are likely to be more instances of police questioning
suspects whose Sixth Amendment rights to counsel have been triggered but
whose Miranda rights have not.271 As a result, courts will have to address
whether police-modified Mirandawarnings are sufficient to apprise a defendant
of his Sixth Amendment Massiah rights.
In the Miranda context, the Court has held that the Miranda wamings are not
to be construed "as if construing a will or defining the terms of an easement;"
rather, "[t]he inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably 'conve[y] to [a
suspect] his rights as required by Miranda.' 272 As Katie Tinto has argued,
however, "[s]ome modifications to the language of the Miranda warnings,
although sanctioned under Fifth Amendment law, are not acceptable from the
standpoint of a Sixth Amendment analysis." 273 In Duckworth itself, for example,
the Court approved a warning in which the suspect was told that he had the right
to a lawyer "if and when you go to court." 274 As Tinto suggests, such language
is misleading with respect to the Sixth Amendment, because it suggests that

267 See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296 n.9 (1988) (recognizing that the waiver
standards might be different between the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in situations that do
not involve custodial interrogation); see also In re Darryl P., 63 A.3d 1142, 1186 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 2013) ("When Patterson equated a waiver of the Miranda-based prophylactic
right with a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right, it clearly did so in the limited context of
custodial interrogation where the two rights were coterminous ....
268 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2184 (2013).
269 565 U.S. 499 (2012).

270 See id. at 516-17.

271 See Bretz, supra note 156, at 238 ("A significant body of evidence, including multiple
studies of police departments, the comments of academic scholars and even recommendations
from a widely accepted officer interrogation manual, suggest that since Miranda,police have
intentionally focused their efforts on securing inculpatory statements from defendants in non-

custodial interrogations." (footnotes omitted)).
272 Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 60 (2010) (quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195,
203 (1989)).
273 Tinto, supra note 36, at 1360-61.
274 Duckworth, 492 U.S. at 197.
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defendants do not have the right to have an attorney present during postindictment police questioning, in direct violation of Massiah.275
Implied waiver. Recall that, in Butler, the Supreme Court held that a suspect's
276
and in
waiver of her Fifth Amendment Miranda rights can be implied,
Thompkins, the Court held that waiver will be implied as long as a Miranda
warning was given and understood by the accused, and the accused gave an
uncoerced statement. 277 That implied waiver doctrine should not be extended to
the Sixth Amendment context. Butler and Thompkins make sense as Fifth
Amendment cases if one believes, as the Court does, that the warnings
themselves can dispel the inherent compulsion in the custodial interrogation
environment. 278 But implied waiver does not make sense in the Sixth
Amendment context. The right to counsel at pretrial critical stages is a
substantive right designed to ensure that defendants have expert assistance to
help them face the accusatorial forces of the government and understand the
intricacies of the system. Counsel is supposed to serve as a "medium" between
the suspect and the government. 279 Advising suspects of their Miranda rights
does not give them that substantive assistance. If they don't want to have the
280
assistance of counsel, they should affirmatively and expressly waive it.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly described the Miranda right to counsel as
a prophylactic protection designed to secure the underlying right to be free of
compelled self-incrimination. 28 1 For that reason, the Court's focus in Thompkins
on whether the waiver is coerced speaks directly to the compulsion at issue under
the Fifth Amendment. In contrast, the Sixth Amendment is not about coercion

Tinto, supra note 36, at 1361.
North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 375-76 (1979) ("[A]n explicit statement of
waiver is not invariably necessary to support a finding that the defendant waived the right to
remain silent or the right to counsel guaranteed by the Mirandacase.").
277 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 371 (2010).
278 I am doubtful that the warnings have this effect. See Kamisar, supra note 19, at 1008275

276

21 (discussing how the Court erred in Thompkins). For a persuasive argument that Thompkins
rests on the faulty premise that suspects in the interrogation room are "autonomous,

empowered individuals who possess the knowledge and wherewithal to assert and protect
their rights and interests," see Witmer-Rich, supra note 2, at 1237-43.
279 See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985).
280 See Bradley, supra note 156, at 263 (arguing for an express waiver requirement). Craig

Bradley seems to believe that, "because Montejo's waiver was not express, it would seem that
the holding in this case has foreclosed that option." Id. at 262. Given that the Montejo Court
remanded for a determination about the validity of Montejo's waiver, however, I do not
believe that the option is foreclosed. See In re Darryl P., 63 A.3d 1142, 1190 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 2013) (rejecting the importation of the Thompkins implied waiver doctrine into the
Massiah context).
281 See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 269 (2011); Maryland v. Shatzer, 559
U.S. 98, 103 (2010); United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636-37 (2004); Chavez v.
Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 (2003); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985); New York
v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
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or compulsion. Denying a person an attorney at a critical pretrial stage is a
completed constitutional violation because the suspect has been deprived of the
attorney's assistance at that critical point.282 Implying waiver because there was
no coercion makes no sense when the constitutional right at issue is not animated
by a concern about coercion.
Consider also the broader scope of the Sixth Amendment pretrial right to
counsel. If waiver can be implied at pretrial interrogations under the Sixth
Amendment, courts would likely imply waiver at other pretrial critical stages.
But courts have rightly found that a defendant's mere participation in a postindictment lineup cannot waive his right to counsel at that critical stage. 283 To
hold otherwise would effectively mean that police could put defendants in
lineups post-indictment and they would be able to create an end run around their
Sixth Amendment protections.
These are just three examples of situations not directly governed by Patterson
and Montejo but that touch on related areas where resistance to entanglement
could generate significant differences between the Miranda and Massiah
doctrines going forward.
2.

Using State Law to Disentangle

When the Supreme Court has entangled the Miranda and Massiah doctrines
in ways that undermine the purposes of the right to counsel, states are free to use
their state law to provide additional right to counsel protections. Justice Brennan
famously implored states to rely on their state constitutions to provide additional
protections for civil liberties and criminal defendants' rights: "[S]tate courts
cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections of the
federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties,
their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's
interpretations of federal law." 284 Many have noted that the Constitution "merely
sets the floor for individual rights" whereas the states "are free to prescribe the
ceiling." 285 All of the states have a right to counsel as part of their state law and
should disentangle the meaning of that state right to counsel from its federal and
state Self-Incrimination Clause counterparts.
Some states have already rejected Pattersonand/orMontejo and have adopted
rules more consistent with the tradition and purposes of the right to counsel in
their state constitutions and statutes. 286 With respect to Patterson, some
See Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 592 (2009).
See, e.g., People v. McCrimmon, 142 A.D.2d 606, 606 (N.Y. 1988) (noting that "the
fact that the defendant voluntarily participated in the lineup" does not constitute a valid
waiver).
284 William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutionsandthe ProtectionofindividualRights, 90
HARV. L. REv. 489, 491 (1977).
285 Stanley Mosk, Beyond the Constitution, 7 CAL. LAW., Aug. 1987, at 100.
286 See, e.g., State v. Liulama, 845 P.2d 1194, 1203 (Haw. Ct. App. 1993); State
v. Lawson,
297 P.3d 1164, 1171-74 (Kan. 2013); Keysor v. Kentucky, 486 S.W.3d 273, 281-82 (Ky.
282
283
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jurisdictions have held that a criminal defendant who has been indicted or
formally charged may not waive his right to counsel unless he does so in the
presence of his attorney. 287 Others have suggested that a waiver of the right to
counsel may also be valid if the defendant is advised before a judicial officer
"that he has been indicted, the significance of an indictment, that he has a right
to counsel, and the seriousness of his situation in the event he should decide to
288
answer questions of any law enforcement officers in the absence of counsel."
Either of these conclusions would disentangle Massiah from Miranda and
provide more robust protection for the Sixth Amendment pretrial right to counsel
predicated on its underlying rationale.
With respect to Montejo, the Montejo Court itself recognized that its decision
to overrule Jackson was at odds with how a number of states had been
interpreting the right to counsel. 289 As a result, it emphasized states' abilities to
continue to provide additional protection to criminal defendants under state law:
"If a State wishes to abstain from requesting interviews with represented
290
defendants when counsel is not present, it obviously may continue to do so."
Some states have already responded to that invitation and rejected Montejo as
a matter of state law.291 In West Virginia, for example, police may not initiate
interrogation "after a defendant asserts his right to counsel at an arraignment or
similar proceeding." 292 In Kentucky, an assertion is not required under state law;
rather, "once the right to counsel has attached by the commencement of formal
criminal charges, any subsequent waiver of that right during a police-initiated
custodial interview is ineffective." 293 And in Kansas, "after the statutory right to

2016); State v. Sanchez, 609 A.2d 400, 408 (N.J. 1992); People v. Grice, 794 N.E.2d 9, 10
(N.Y. 2003); State v. Bevel, 745 S.E.2d 237, 247 (W. Va. 2013).
287 E.g., Grice, 794 N.E.2d at 10 (describing the "indelible right to counsel" under the New
York Constitution under which "interrogation is prohibited unless the right is waived in the
presence of counsel"); see also Bradley, supra note 156, at 252 (arguing that "[o]nce formal
proceedings have begun, police-initiated interrogations [should be] forbidden, absent
permission of counsel"); Bretz, supra note 156, at 241-42; Tinto, supra note 36, at 1367.
288 Sanchez, 609 A.2d at 408 (quoting United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1153 (2d
Cir. 1980)); see also Liulama, 845 P.2d at 1203 ("[W]e do not believe the government should
be allowed to conduct a postindictment interrogation until the accused has been specifically
advised of such right by a court or by his own counsel."); Mims, supra note 156, at 369-70
(arguing for more stringent waiver requirements for post-indictment interrogations that would
parallel the waiver requirements for waiving the right to counsel at trial).
289 Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 793 (2009).
290 Id. at 793 (footnote omitted).
291 E.g., Lawson, 297 P.3d at 1171-74; Keysor, 486 S.W.3d at 281-82; Bevel, 745 S.E.2d
at 247; see also Bretz, supra note 156, at 251 (arguing that states should "adopt an approach
that would, following the initiation of formal charges, prohibit police-initiated questioning of
all defendants who have invoked their right to an attorney").
292 Bevel, 745 S.E.2d at 247.
293 Keysor, 486 S.W.3d at 282.
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counsel has attached, the defendant's uncounseled waiver of that right will not
be valid unless it is made in writing and on the record in open court." 294

These more protective state regimes tend to better align with the underlying
purposes of a pretrial right to counsel. More states should look to the history and
traditions surrounding their state statutory and constitutional right-to-counsel
provisions and find that "Montejo's degradation of the right to counsel is
antithetical to [the state's] perception of the right to counsel." 295
CONCLUSION

Looking back on the five decades since the Miranda decision, it is easy to
focus solely on the ways that the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts have
denigrated criminal suspects' Mirandarights. But the damage is now extending
beyond the Miranda context. Both the Supreme Court and lower courts have
begun using Miranda precedent to chip away at protections guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment pretrial right to counsel. The entanglement of Miranda and
Massiah, however, is not complete and should be stopped from going further.
Litigants and courts should not confuse the Miranda Fifth Amendment regime,
which is designed to protect the privilege against compelled self-incrimination,
with the Massiah Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Instead, courts should
focus on the underlying purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counselensuring fairness and equality in the adversarial system-when considering the
scope of criminal suspects' Sixth Amendment protections going forward.
Perhaps then the Sixth Amendment right to counsel can perform its intended
function.

294

Lawson, 297 P.3d at 1173.

295 Keysor, 486 S.W.3d at 281; see also Bretz, supra note 156, at 225 (arguing that lower
courts should provide greater protection through the interpretation of state constitutional

provisions); Mims, supra note 156, at 347 (arguing that Montejo "should be limited by state
constitutions").
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